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Abstract— All cryptographic algorithms have a proven security 
but they suffer from the key management problems: hiding a key 
and unlocking it with biometric or other approximately matching 
data. We propose a practical key capsulation mechanism with a 
simple and intuitive design concept to overcome the management 
and security issues. Capsulation process solved the problems of 
key management and distributes level of security on capsulation 
shields. Keys entropy depends on level of shielding, secret key 
depend on degree of polynomial, while encryption key depend on 
constructed vault entropy, and it is slightly more efficient in 
terms of encryption/decryption speed because it used a heading 
capsulation technique on covering the ciphertexts. Our results in 
term of attack computation complexity analysis are encouraging, 
while it is acceptable for the authorized users.  
Keywords-component; biometric, template, cryptography, fuzzy 
vault, security, complexity, attack. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid growth of information technology fields, e-
commerce, e-banking, e-voting and e-government have become 
an important part of our daily life. In electronic information 
management the live interaction is impossible, thus the validity 
of contract has to be verified as well as certified by secured 
verification and or authentication scenarios. Therefore, a 
merging of cryptography and biometrics has been introduced as 
part of privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) with respect of 
personal data protection. Security systems based on biometric 
cryptographic have attained popularity and superiority 
compared to traditional security methods, because they 
increase user convenience, reliability and robustness against 
impostor users. However, they are vulnerable to attacks such as 
cracking, hacking and tracking of source information (e.g., 
minutiae based templates) to extract the secret key and or 
crypto algorithm construction. Therefore storing the biometric 
template is becoming extremely important. One possible 
approach is to encrypt the template before storing it [1], [2]. 
While biometric is permanently associated with a user and 
cannot be changed a compromises of biometric template will 
lead to lose forever usage and cannot be rest or replaced, a 
possible approach to avoid this serious problem is to generate 
multiple cancelable templates by issuing a new transformable 
key [3]. Another major problem with using biometrics is their 
non-repeatability. To overcome this problem, [4] proposed a 
Fuzzy Vault Scheme which utilizes the error correcting codes 
to produce a symmetric cryptosystems that can tolerate some 
differences in the values of the encryption and decryption keys. 
Crypto biometric systems have been emerging as an effective 
means to address the convenient and security issues with the 
comparison to traditional passcode or key released systems. It 
intends to bind a cryptographic key with the user’s biometric 
information in a manner to meet the distortion tolerance and 
discrimination. Bio crypt keys introduced to solve 
cryptographic keys management problems, because all 
cryptographic algorithms fully depend on the assumption that 
the keys will be kept in absolute secrecy. Long and random this 
makes it impossible for users to memorize. As a result, they 
must be stored securely and released based on some strong 
authentication mechanisms. Therefore, keys can be used in 
encryption-decryption procedures. Biometric based 
authentication is a potential candidate to provide a capsulation 
cover for traditional and general cryptographic keys. 
Fingerprint biometrics has been chosen as a core construction 
of fuzzy vault based capsulation proposed technique due to it is 
mature in terms of availability, uniqueness, permanence, 
feasibility, ease of use and acceptance [5]. Cryptographic and 
biometric systems can be merged in one of the following two 
based: (1) loosely-coupled mode (biometric key release), the 
biometric matching is decupled from the cryptographic part. 
Biometric matching operates on the traditional biometric 
template: if they match, cryptographic key release from it is 
secure location, e.g. a server or smart card. (2) tightly-coupled 
mode (biometric key generation), biometric and cryptography 
are merged together at a much deeper level, where matching 
can effectively take place within cryptographic domain, hence 
there is no separate matching operation that can be attacked; 
key extracted from a collected heterogeneous mass (key/bio 
template) as a result of positive matching. Cryptographic 
construct (Fuzzy Vault) is an example of this mode, was 
proposed by Juels and Sudan [4]. This cryptographic construct 
is subject of our proposed technique as a core of capsulation 
construct. 
II. PREVIOUS WORK  
To overcome the integration of biometric into 
cryptosystem, a number of approaches were introduced in the 
literatures. These can be divided into three categories: Key 
hidden, one way function generator and Fuzzy key generation 
[6]. The seed of our capsulation construct approach is the 
concealed fingerprint fuzzy vault. Juels and Wattenberg [7] 
present the first crypto biometric system called fuzzy 
commitment, in which cryptographic key is de-committed 
using biometric data. The committed value will be extracted 
when the fuzziness value close to the original enrolled value. 
The fuzzy commitment scheme is based on the use of error 
correcting codes, considers binary strings where the similarity 
is measured by Hamming distance. Building upon the ideas of 
the fuzzy commitment scheme, another version, using 
something called fuzzy vault [4], was developed. The fuzzy 
vault scheme considers sets of elements in a finite field with set 
difference as the distance function, and corrects errors by 
polynomial interpolation. Based on the fuzzy vault, some 
implementations results for fingerprint have been reported. 
Uludge, et al. [8] introduced a modification to the fuzzy vault 
scheme, which eliminates the need for Reed-Solomon 
polynomial decoding. Clancy, et al. [9] proposed a fuzzy vault 
scheme based on the location of minutiae points in a 
fingerprint. [8] [9] assumed that fingerprints are pre-aligned, 
which is not a realistic assumption in practical fingerprint 
authentication systems. Yang, et al. [10] also used only the 
location information about the minutiae points. Nagar, et al. 
[11] introduced the modified fuzzy vault scheme based on 
evaluation the polynomial on all the points in the domain to 
make it more robust against variation in the values of biometric 
features. The alignment assumption in previous approaches 
limits their applicability's. Therefore, to solve alignment 
problem, Uludge, et al. [12] used an Iterative Closest Point 
(ICP) to determine the alignment between the template and the 
query based on extracted helper data. Chung, et al. [13] 
proposed an automatic alignment approach by using the 
geometric hashing technique. Their method has been used for 
model based object recognition applications; it could be 
integrated with any fuzzy fingerprint vault systems. 
III. BIOMETRIC KEY CAPSULATION 
Biometric key capsulation (BKC) is an approach to 
combine the advantages of both biometric authentication and 
cryptography-based control by addressing the problem of how 
to reliably recover a cryptographic key from imprecise 
biometric readings. A cryptographic key and vault are 
capsulated using fuzziness capsulation of transformed 
biometric data. Fuzziness means that a value close to the 
original (under some suitable metrics) is sufficient to extract 
the encapsulated value. Fuzzy encapsulation technique is both 
concealing and binding: it difficult for attacker to learn the 
capsulated value. 
A. Capsulation Pre-Processing 
It is well-known that for encryption, keys at both the sender 
and receiver sides must match exactly. However, repeated 
capture of biometric data from the same subject usually does 
not result in identical data in each capture.  For example, 
multiple fingerprint images of the same finger will result in 
non-identical, but similar, minutiae (location and number) 
extraction. This is due to several factors, including sensing 
errors, alignment errors, presentation angles, finger 
deformation, skin oils, dirt, etc. Because of this inexact  
 
         Figure1.  Biometric Key capsulation block diagram 
reproducibility, a method is needed to “correct” the data before 
it is presented to the processing subsystem in order to obtain 
reproducible results. This can be accomplished by applying 
error-correcting codes [14], as is common practice when 
recovering messages transmitted over a noisy channel. Yoichi, 
et al. [15] proposed a statistical A/D conversion as effective 
scheme to convert biometric data to just one; their solution 
could be used as another scenario to overcome the template 
reproducibility problems.  Either [14] or [15] are useful for 
preparing minutiae based templates as a first stage of 
capsulation approach. 
B. Encapsulation Algorithm 
The encapsulation portion of the security diagram is the 
creation of capsulation shields Fig.1, which is the seed of our 
proposed approach. A transformed template features created 
from original minutiae based template which is extracted from 
scanned or acquisitioned fingerprint image, applying the 
concatenation transformation on true data points to avoid using 
direct template, the transformed matrix (TM) value is 
represented as transformed features string. 
( ),y||xTM =  
where x, y are minutiae point coordination 
                                           
(1) 
A chaff point algorithm Fig.2 is used to generate a random 
chaff points (CP). CP added to TM based on union relation 
generate a total points set (TP), Fig.3.  
CPTMTP ∪=                                         (2) 
TP servers as first capsulation shield. Next, a construct vault 
( )TPV is computed from TP, and injected secret key (SK) Fig. 
4. ( )TPV  could be used as a second capsulation shield as well 
as to be stored in the headed of the encrypted file in clear for 
vault reconstructed usage at the decryption stage. 
Mathematically, polynomial evaluation value of (Galois field 
array (polynomial coefficients, SK within field domain array 
and encoded total points array) returns the value of a 
polynomial of degree n evaluated at total points. It could be 
seen from (3) that P  is a vector of length 1N +  whose 
elements are the coefficients of the polynomial in descending 
powers.  
)1N(PX*)N(P...
)1N(^X*)2(PN^X*)1(PY
++++
−+=
 
       (3) 
Finally, a part of encrypted vault servers as file header for the 
encryption usage, or in the header of the encrypted file. 
 
Inputs:             Transformed points (true points) 
                        Threshold distance 
Output: TP (total points) – True and chaff points Array 
Algorithm      
( )points  true thresh,points, chaff ofnumber ←TP
              Do while conditions 
           If it within distance from any previously points {  
                       Then discard it} 
           If not { 
                   Select it} 
              CPTMTP ∪=  
 Return  
End   
 
            Figure 2 Chaff point generation algorithm 
                  Figure 3 (a) Transformed point's distribution.   
             Figure 3 (b) Total points(TM, CP) distribution 
  Inputs:             Injected secret key (SK) 
                        Total points (TP) 
Output: ( )TPV  (Vault total points) % Array containing. 
Algorithm      
( ) 



←
TP fromarray  field Galois ,polynomial 
of tscoefficien as  message encodedSK 
TPV  
Do compute 
  Galois field array of SK in the coordinate’s domain  ( )162..0  
   
  Galois field array of TP in the coordinate’s domain  ( )162..0  
          ( )TPV = Evaluate polynomial value of encoded SK & TP 
Return ( )TPV  
End   
                        Figure 4 Vault construction algorithm 
 
Figure 5 Biometric Key decapsulation block diagram 
C. Decapsulation Algorithm 
To decapsulate the vault and recover its components (i.e. the 
message, chaff points, transformed points), the data points 
(OM′) from the “live” template (the unshielded set) are used 
for decapsulation. If a transformed substantial number (i.e. 
within the symbol-correcting capability of the system) of these 
enquiry data points overlap (after error-correction) the true 
transformed points in the stored vault, then the message can be 
successfully recovered, as well as partially vault (header file 
key) will be released for final shield of encrypted file. In 
decapsulation portion of the security capsulation diagram, A 
FIFO (first input first output) rule must be applied for the 
  
whole decryption process. Follow the principles, the 
constructed vault will be unshielded, decapsulated to the key 
release, finally the binded secret key, and header key are 
released Fig.4. 
 
IV. EXPECTED ATTACKS 
Biometric key capsulation approach use benefit of binding 
crypto biometric techniques, it combined revocable 
transformable temples, generated chaff points, hiding secret  
transformable amidst chaff points, vault construct, and 
shielding (encapsulation, decapsulation) technique. Referring 
to the Fig.5, attackers have to brutally attack the cycles of 
shielding to yield encapsulated keys, which they are related to 
each other hierarchy. The total complexity of the proposed 
approach belongs to the nested loop analysis computational 
complexity. BKC contain three nested loops, core inner, and 
two outers, thus the complexity is: 
( )times_innertimes_outer2times_outer1 ndst ∗∗Ο , 
It could be concluded that the classes of attacks against our 
approach in: brute force attack against all BKC shields (i.e. EK, 
V, and TM), chaff point identifications to find the original ones 
[16]. As example the brute-force method of vault attacking, or 
bf (r, t, k), where r is the total number of points, t is the number 
of real points, and k is the degree of the polynomial. For an 
attacker, r and t are the same as the ones in the vault parameter, 
however for a valid user, r is the size of their unlocking set and 
t is the number of non-chaff points in that set. The complexity 
of brute force ( bfC ) can be calculated according to the 
equation 4. 
1tr
bfC
−




σ



σ=  
 (4) 
where σ  is the point that interpolate a degree k polynomial, 
which is 1k +=σ . 
V. SIMULATION RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
Biometric Key Capsulation Technique was implemented on 
the FVC2004-DB1 [17], a public domain database with 800 
images (100 fingers, 8 impressions each finger), (cropped into 
256x256 sizes, 500 dpi resolutions), converted into WSQ 
format, for convenience to simulate the capsulation processes, 
original minutiae extracted using minutiae detector 
(MINDTCT) released by NIST fingerprint image software 2 
[18].The transformed points taken on base of concatenating the 
original points coordination, where the average of extracted 
minutiae is 52 points while chaff points were chosen to be 300 
points. Point threshold distance adapted to 6 according to the 
Berlekamp-Welch error correcting code. The condition in 
equation is mdk2 <+ . That means to successfully decode 
the finger vault, the number of impostor points must 
satisfy ( ) 2/dmk −< , where m , is the total number of the 
input transformed points. The core of proposed BKC is the 
Figure 6 the relationship between chaff points, minimum distance and release 
ability of locked key. 
Figure 7 the relationship between chaff points, Polynomial degree and vault 
complexity 
 
cancelable constructed vault, which we will test it under all 
reconstruction parameters, like polynomial degree, minimum 
distance of point distribution, and vault complexity. Fig.6 
shows the relationship between chaff points, minimum distance 
and release ability of locked key. We set the minimum distance 
to satisfy the following rules: chaff points cannot be placed to 
close to real points, no reason to place chaff points next to each 
others at any distance less than minimum distance, because the 
attacker can immediately ignore them as unlikely candidates. 
While Fig.7 shows the relationship between polynomial degree 
and vault complexity where the used extracted minutiae is 52 
points while chaff points were chosen to be vary from 100 to 
500 points. A basic anatomy of vault unlocking can be viewed 
in two contexts. The first is the complexity of a valid user 
unlocking a vault with a matching fingerprint image. One goal 
is to minimize this complexity. The second context is the 
complexity of an attacker without fingerprint information 
trying to crack the vault. All researchers in this field wish to 
maximize this complexity while the attacker wishes to 
minimize it. Fig.7 shows that higher level of security is related 
to higher degree of polynomial as well as a maximum number 
of chaff points. However, it is clear that a higher complexity 
could be achieved with maximum values of vault parameters.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Anatomy of biometric key capsulation has been presented 
on all shielding levels, cancellable transformable extracted 
template, feeding hiding chaff points, constructed vault source, 
and header encrypted key. A merging crypto biometric was 
shown through pervious levels. The approach takes advantage 
of crypto biometric merging to solve a very important problem 
in cryptography field, i.e. key management problem. In 
addition this approach provides encouraging prospects to 
address some of the major limitation of a fingerprint vault and 
provides enhanced security. Anatomy observation has been 
shown on based of brute force attack for the core of BKC, i.e. 
fingerprint vault. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] S. Yang and I. Verbauwhede, “Automatic Secure Fingerprint 
Verification System Based on Fuzzy Vault Scheme”, in Proceedings of 
IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal 
Processing, Vol. 5, Philadelphia, USA, March 2005, pp. 609–612.  
[2] K. Nandakumar, A. Nagar and A. K. Jain, “Hardening Fingerprint Fuzzy 
Vault Using Password”, in Proceedings of 2nd International Conference 
on Biometrics, LNCS 4642, pp. 927–937, August 2007, Seoul, South 
Korea. 
[3] N. Ratha, S. Chikkerur, J. H. Connell and R.M. Bolle, , “Generating 
Cancelable Fingerprint Templates”, IEEE Trans. on PAMI, Vol. 29, No. 
4, pp. 561–572, April 2007.  
[4] Juels, A. and M. Sudan. A fuzzy vault scheme. in Information Theory, 
2002. Proceedings. 2002 IEEE International Symposium on. 2002. 
[5] P. Reid, Biometrics and network security, Prentice Hall PTR, 2003 
[6] M. S. Al-Tarawneh, L. C. Khor, W. L. Woo and S. S. Dlay, "Crypto key 
generation using contour graph algorithm " Proceedings of the 24th 
iasted international conference on signal processing, pattern recognition, 
and applications ACTA Press, Innsbruck, Austria 2006 pp. 95-98  
[7] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg, "A fuzzy commitment scheme , "
Proceedings of the 6th acm conference on computer and 
communications security ,ACM Press, 1999, pp. 28-36. 
[8] U. Uludag, S. Pankanti and A. K. Jain, "Fuzzy Vault for Fingerprints", 
Proc. of Audio- and Video-based Biometric Person Authentication 
(AVBPA) 2005, pp. 310-319, Rye Brook, NY, July 2005.  
[9] T. C. Clancy, N. Kiyavash and D. J. Lin, "Secure smartcardbased 
fingerprint authentication , " Proceedings of the 2003 acm sigmm 
workshop on biometrics methods and applications ,ACM Press, Berkley ,
California, 2003, pp. 45-52.  
[10] S. Yang and I. Verbauwhede, "Automatic Secure Fingerprint 
Verification System Based on Fuzzy Vault Scheme,” IEEE International 
Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing (ICASSP 
2005), pp. 609-612, March 2005 
[11] A. Nagar and S. Chaudhury, "Biometrics based asymmetric 
cryptosystem design using modified fuzzy vault scheme " Proceedings 
of the 18th international conference on pattern recognition - volume 04 
IEEE Computer Society, 2006 pp. 537-540  
[12] U. Uludag and A. Jain, "Securing fingerprint template: Fuzzy vault with 
helper data " Proceedings of the 2006 conference on computer vision 
and pattern recognition workshop IEEE Computer Society  ,2006 p. 163 
[13] Y. Chung, D. Moon, S. Lee, S. Jung, T. Kim, D. Ahn, "Automatic 
Alignment of Fingerprint Features for Fuzzy Fingerprint Vault,"  CISC 
2005: 358-369 
[14] Davida, G.I., Y. Frankel, and B.J. Matt. On enabling secure applications 
through off-line biometric identification. in IEEE Symposium on Security 
and Privacy  Proceedings. 1998. USA. 
[15] S. YOICHI, M. MASAHIRO, T. KENTA, N. ITSUKAZU, S. 
MASAKAZU and N. MASAKATSU, Mechanism-based PKI : A Real-
time Key Generation from Fingerprints, Transactions of Information 
Processing Society of Japan, 45 (2004), pp. 833-1844 
[16] E.-C. Chang, R. Shen and F. W. Teo ,Finding the original point set 
hidden among chaff ,Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on 
Information, computer and communications security ,ACM Press, 
Taipei ,Taiwan, 2006, pp. 182-188. 
[17] http://bias.csr.unibo.it/fvc2004/default.asp  
[18] NIST FINGERPRINT IMAGE SOFTWARE 2 (NFIS2), 
http://www.nist.gov/ 
 
